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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes a mechanism for clearing a 
physical market for intra-day schedules of receipts and 
deliveries of a natural gas pipeline.  The Gas 
Balancing Market (GBM) is implemented to trade 
deviations from previously confirmed ratable 
nominations by solving a rolling horizon model 
predictive control (MPC) optimization formulation.  
The GBM mechanism operates by accepting 
quantity/price offers and bids from sellers and buyers 
of gas and producing an economically optimal 
schedule while guaranteeing its physical feasibility.  
The GBM’s solution engine is based on a strict 
mathematical representation of engineering factors of 
transient pipeline hydraulics and compressor station 
operations.  The GBM’s settlement of cleared 
transactions is based on Locational Trade Values 
(LTVs) of natural gas that are fully consistent with the 
physics of energy flow.  In this paper we provide 
numerical results of simulating a hypothetical GBM 
market operation using historical SCADA data for an 
actual pipeline system operation during the Polar 
Vortex period of February – March 2014.  Based on 
these simulations, we quantify the potential 
deliverability and economic benefits of the GBM 
utilizing transient optimization of pipeline operations. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The growing reliance of the bulk electric power 
system on gas-fired generation has increased the need 
to improve the coordination between the wholesale 
natural gas and electricity markets.  
 Replacement of coal fired and nuclear plants with 
gas-fired generating capacity significantly increases the 
amount of natural gas used as fuel for power 
generation.  At the same time, the volatility of electric 
generation delivered from wind and solar increases the 
variability of pipeline deliveries to match the demand 
of gas-fired generators used to balance the electric grid.  
The resulting intra-day and even sub-hourly demand 
swings for natural gas to fuel for electric generation 
create new challenges for pipeline operators, and may 
pose reliability risks for both gas pipelines and electric 
systems.   
The need to better coordinate both sectors to 
mitigate these risks is well recognized and is 
specifically reflected in Orders 787 and 809 of the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) that 
regulates access to pipeline capacity [1,2].  
Coordination mechanisms proposed to date are based 
on widening the scope of operational information 
exchanges between the two sectors, and on adjusting 
the timing of these exchanges [3].  While these 
measures are helpful, a truly efficient coordination 
should be based on timely exchange of both physical 
and pricing data, with price formation in both markets 
being fully consistent with the physics of energy flow.  
Electricity prices consistent with the physical 
power flows on the grid are the outcome of economic 
optimization of power system operation in electricity 
markets administered by Regional Transmission 
Organizations (RTOs) [4, 5].  A similar optimization 
approach that accounts for physical and engineering 
Proceedings of the 52nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2019
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10125/59799
ISBN: 978-0-9981331-2-6
(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) Page 3627
factors of gas pipeline and compressor station 
operations would lead to location and time dependent 
economic valuation of natural gas consistent with the 
physics of gas flow.  Such an approach has been 
formulated in [6] under the simplified assumption of 
steady state pipeline flows.   
A more general formulation would consider a truly 
dynamic transient flow of natural gas, which is 
essential for representing gas flow dynamics in time 
frames of the same order of physical changes that 
occur on the power grid. The problem formulation can 
be described as a model predictive control (MPC) 
approach, which uses a forecast of system conditions 
and other time-dependent inputs to optimize pipeline 
flows over a given time-horizon, such as 24 hours. 
This paper relies on [8, 14].  Ref. [8] defines a 
transient pipeline optimization problem that maximizes 
total market surplus over supply and offtake schedules.  
The market surplus in defined within the context of 
Gas Balancing Market [14].  Market Surplus is defined 
as the sum of the producer/supplier surplus and 
consumer/buyer surplus.  Producer surplus is the 
difference between the revenue the producer obtains in 
the market and the minimum value the producer is 
willing to accept for the goods sold.  Similarly, 
consumer surplus is the difference between the 
maximum price the consumer is willing to pay for a 
good and the price the consumer ends up paying for it.  
Market surplus is the sum of individual surpluses over 
all consumers/buyers and producers/sellers 
participating in the market.  
The appropriate transient optimization solution 
dynamically allocates pipeline capacity among 
transactions between suppliers and consumers based on 
the economic value of these transactions.  Compressor 
operations and line pack are optimized in conjunction 
with the selection of location-dependent offers to sell, 
and bids to buy natural gas.  Location based (nodal) 
prices of natural gas are computed as dual variables 
corresponding to the nodal flow balance constraints in 
the optimal solution and reflect the time and location 
dependent economic value of gas in the network.   
In this paper we demonstrate the capability to 
operate a pipeline system in practice using the Gas 
Balancing Market (GBM) introduced in [14] through a   
case study of a section of a  pipeline subsystem in the 
United States using network data obtained from a 
capacity planning model as well as physical 
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) 
system data and historical market information during a 
period of highly congested conditions.  We 
demonstrate that using our proposed formulation it is 
possible to significantly increase pipeline throughput 
with the added benefit of more efficient prices 
throughout the system.  Both advantages are 
demonstrated with respect to historical data on physical 
and market conditions.  In addition to quantifying the 
economic benefits of the proposed mechanism, we 
demonstrate the potential to use the modeling tool in 
analysis and planning of wholesale electricity markets 
with high reliance on natural gas. 
This is the first paper to present an analysis of the 
operation of the natural gas market design based on 
transient optimization of a pipeline network utilizing 
real system data.  In addition to incorporating actual 
physical data we developed a set of economic inputs 
based on actual economic information and on 
assumptions made to compensate for the lack of data 
needed to model the behavior of market participants.   
    To place simulation results into an appropriate 
context, Section 2 restates the motivation and key 
principles underlying the proposed Gas Balancing 
Market (GBM).  
Section 3 provides and details of the computational 
case study using real data, Section 4 provides analysis 
of simulation results and discusses some policy 
implications.  Section 5 contains a summary of 
conclusions. 
 
2. Gas Balancing Market  
 
2.1. Motivation 
 
Electric and natural gas networks follow distinct 
but inter-related decision processes for scheduling their 
operations.  As discussed in [14], there exists a highly 
intricate succession of decision cycles on both the 
electric side and natural gas side. A gas-fired 
generating unit considering operating the next electric 
day (which begins at midnight) should submit an offer 
to the Day-Ahead power market on the prior day by 
10:30 AM Eastern Time.  Prior to that, the asset 
manager for the generating unit would procure gas 
supply and delivery.  Because electric generators 
usually do not have firm supply contracts on the 
pipeline, delivery to a pipeline receipt point will be 
arranged at a bilaterally negotiated price.  Shipment of 
gas from the receipt point to the delivery point on the 
pipeline could be arranged on a firm basis through the 
capacity release mechanism or on a non-firm basis by 
obtaining interruptible capacity. This process yields a 
preliminary supply arrangement and gas prices.  These 
prices, although not backed up by delivery guarantees, 
inform electric generators on how to bid in the day-
ahead (DA) electricity market.  This process exposes 
transacting parties to various kinds of risk.   
Once the DA market clears and the financially 
binding operational schedules for electric generators 
are determined, generators have just enough time to 
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make delivery nominations with the pipeline for the 
next gas day.  If the nominations are confirmed in the 
Timely and/or Evening gas scheduling cycles, daily 
delivery quantities are essentially guaranteed. 
However, even if confirmed, the quantities needed by 
the generator may be different from those preliminarily 
arranged and the difference must be settled between 
the parties. 
If deliveries needed by the generator are not 
confirmed due to pipeline capacity limitations, 
generators would face significant financial exposure 
when they are obligated to deliver power but have no 
gas to produce it.  This financial exposure is two-fold:  
the generator may need to acquire replacement power 
in the real-time market and also may be facing non-
performance penalties if the electric replacement 
power purchase occurs at a time of scarcity. 
Even if the daily delivery quantity is confirmed, the 
pipeline typically expects that gas will be taken in 
equal quantities each hour of the gas day (i.e., a 
“ratable” quantity).  Generators, however, typically 
need non-ratable quantities which pipelines may be 
able to accommodate but cannot guarantee.   
Furthermore, most fast-start combined cycle 
generators and gas turbine peaking facilities are not 
committed in the DA market.  Instead those units are 
typically scheduled through the hourly reliability 
updates or close to the real-time market.  These “last-
minute” decisions do not fit into the existing decision 
cycles on the gas side. For these generators that are 
critical for maintaining a reliable electric service and 
providing essential ancillary services there is no 
transparent mechanism on the gas side under which 
they can purchase gas and schedule delivery as needed. 
Sudden ramps required by these generators may cause 
operational problems to the pipelines.  If these 
generators receive no gas, this would jeopardize the 
operational reliability of the electrical grid, while 
delivering gas to these units may jeopardize the 
reliability of the pipeline system. 
We propose to solve these problems through the 
formation of the hour-by-hour natural gas balancing 
market (GBM) that would allow market participants to 
trade deviations from approved ratable schedules 
throughout the Timely and Evening Cycles.   
These deviations could be traded through the 
formal optimization-based auction type market 
mechanisms described in the next section.   Such an 
auction could be run on an hourly basis using a rolling 
horizon approach, such that each hour the auction 
would optimize the system for multiple upcoming 
hours (e.g. 36 hours or even more).  Such a balancing 
market would provide a repeated forward-looking price 
discovery mechanism to help both the gas and electric 
sectors to more efficiently coordinate their operations.  
 
2.2. Gas Balancing Market  
 
The proposed Gas Balancing Market (GBM) would 
have voluntary participation and would be 
administered by a pipeline specific market operator. It 
would function as a two-sided auction conducted on 
the gas pipeline network.   
GBM transactions occur at network nodes that are 
primarily custodial meters where gas changes hands, 
compressor stations, and pipe interconnection points.  
Network edges are the pipes that physically connect 
the nodes.  Auction participants are buyers and sellers 
of gas submitting price/quantity (P/Q) offers/bids to 
sell/buy gas at network nodes.  Their buy/sell positions 
are primarily driven by the need to buy gas above the 
ratable schedules or the desire to sell gas in excess of 
ratable schedules.  Thus, the same market participant 
may act as a buyer in one hour and as a seller in 
another hour.  Ratable schedules would be based on 
deliveries confirmed at the Timely or Evening 
nomination cycles.  In addition, the market would 
allow participation of buyers and sellers who have no 
day-ahead confirmed schedules or firm capacity rights.  
Offers and bids are submitted with an hourly time 
step for a multi-hour optimization horizon (e.g., 36 
hours).   
The Auctioneer’s objective function is to 
maximize, over the optimization horizon, the market 
surplus between accepted bids and offers less the costs 
of running the pipeline by operating gas compressors. 
The auction repeats periodically (e.g. every hour or 
every several hours based on actual design) with the 
start and end time of the optimization horizon shifting 
along with the auction repeat time and continuously 
transitioning from one gas day to another. 
 The optimization problem is formulated subject to 
the dynamic transient pipeline flow equations and must 
satisfy key engineering constraints.  The latter are 
limitations on the maximum allowed operating 
pressure at each pipe, minimum pressure requirements 
at each node, horsepower limitations and compression 
ratios of compressors. 
The outcome of the auction includes: 
• Hourly schedules for receipt and deliveries of 
natural gas over the optimization horizon for each 
buyer and seller and for each node of the network.  
These schedules are the net results of ratable 
schedules and buy/sell positions cleared in the 
market; 
• Hourly shadow prices of nodal mass balance 
equations referred to as Locational Trade Values 
(LTVs) of natural gas; 
• Operational compressor setting and compression 
ratios for each compressor station; 
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• Pressure dynamics at pipes and nodes. 
Market clearing for the first hour of the optimization 
horizon will be ex post to actual deliveries in that hour.  
Market clearings for all subsequent hours of that 
horizon will be ex ante.  
All cleared positions for all hours of the optimization 
horizon will be financially binding. 
These market results will be financially binding, thus 
giving gas buyers and sellers assurance of obtaining 
needed gas or liquidating any excess supply at a price 
that is acceptable and known ahead of the delivery.  
Since the market is cleared multiple times for the same 
period, future uncertainties are resolved. This is 
because the positions taken in earlier instances of the 
GBM could be liquidated later if necessary or 
desirable.  In sum, the proposed market structure will 
provide a transparent and efficient mechanism for near 
real-time gas trading and corresponding gas price 
discovery. 
   The proposed GBM timing is aligned with 
nomination cycles that are in place for natural gas 
pipelines in the United States.  The first trading of a 
particular GBM cycle is aligned with the completion of 
the Evening Nomination Cycle (21:00 Central Time) 
and would have an optimization horizon of 36 hours 
which will cover the remaining portion of the current 
gas day (from 21:00 to 09:00 of the following day) and 
the entire gas day from 09:00 to 09:00 of the day that 
follows.  The next trading will occur at 22:00 and will 
have an optimization horizon of 35 hours also ending 
at 09:00 of the day after the following day. 
Because the optimization is conducted subject to 
the gas flow physics and engineering constraints, 
market clearing assures feasibility of delivery 
schedules identified.  The underlying mathematical 
formulation of the optimization problem behind GBM 
is provided in [14]. 
 
2.3. Gas System Optimizer (GSO) 
The study used our Gas System Optimizer (GSO) 
model schematically depicted in Figure 1. GSO 
implements transient optimization algorithms as 
described in [12]. 
 
  
   Figure 1. Gas Supply Optimizer 
 
GSO optimizes the dynamic schedules and operation of 
a natural gas pipeline network.  GSO finds the optimal 
pipeline flows and delivery schedules with the 
concurrent operations of compressor stations and line 
pack dynamics. In parallel, GSO determines the 
economic value of natural gas at any point in time and 
at any network location.  For the purpose of this paper, 
GSO is used to compute GBM problem solutions.  The 
inputs include the static network model and a 
collection of time-dependent parameters.  The static 
network model contains specifications for the nodes, 
pipes, and compressors on the system.  In addition, we 
specify gNodes, which represent sellers or offtakers of 
gas on the system, more than one of which can 
correspond to a physical network node.  These can 
represent any meter stations, and multiple gNodes can 
be used to represent different price\quantity levels for 
the same customer.   
The temporal parameters for the GSO solver 
include purchases, sales, bid and offer prices,  flows 
corresponding to pre-existing contracts, minimum and 
maximum offtake curves of buyers, and minimum and 
maximum supply curves as described above.  The 
temporal outputs are physical variables that include 
discharge pressure, power, compression ratios, suction 
and discharge pressure, and through flow for all 
compressors on the system; cleared purchases and sales 
for all customers participating in the market; nodal 
pressures; and pressures and flows at each end of all 
pipes in the system.  In addition to the physical 
solution, a market solution is provided that includes the 
LTV at each node, as well as the dual variables 
corresponding to constraints on compressor power and 
discharge pressure. 
To model rolling horizon based optimization, the 
GSO tool can accept initial conditions to initialize the 
problem and output the system state at any specified 
time, so that it can be used to optimize the subsequent 
rolling horizon optimization step.  While the 
computational implementation of the GBM solution 
requires elliptic (i.e. time-periodic) boundary 
conditions, the real data that is used in our case study is 
aperiodic.  In order to apply the computational tool, for 
each solve over a time horizon , the problem is 
solved over an extended time horizon  and 
the solution is then restricted back to .  The 
output state at time  is subsequently used to initialize 
the solution on the next time horizon . 
    
 
3. Computational Case Study 
 
3.1 The Physical Dataset  
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The computational case study discussed in this 
section is based on data obtained from a planning 
model of a pipeline system in the United States and 
temporal SCADA data measured from the same system 
during February and March of 2014, a period when 
energy networks in the United States were particularly 
stressed due to Polar Vortex conditions. The process 
used to develop and validate the network model by 
comparing simulations against SCADA measurements 
is described in [9].  As explained in that paper, the 
network model was simplified from a model used for 
capacity planning, typically with steady-state 
optimization. The simplification relied on several 
assumptions.  First, passive components and 
connections in the system such as valves were 
removed, and their status (open/closed) was used to 
determine any modifications to the topology.  Second, 
although multiple compressor units make up a 
compressor station, the suction and discharge of the 
entire station occur through common headers.  Thus, 
we modeled each compressor station as a single 
aggregate compressor with an aggregate power and 
assume that the individual compressor units can be 
controlled locally to maintain the desired discharge 
pressure of the entire station. The extracted subsystem 
is illustrated in Figure 2, and consists of 78 model 
nodes, 95 pipes with total length of 444.25 miles, and 4 
compressor stations. Major inflow is at the suction of 
compressor 1 and main outflow is from node X, with 
smaller offtakes throughout the system and at laterals. 
Inflow at compressor 1 and outflow at node X feed the 
upstream and downstream portions of the same 
pipeline, respectively.  This network serves three 
power plants located at nodes labelled E, H and Q. 
For each pipe, the physical parameters used were 
length, diameter, and friction factor, which were taken 
directly from the pipeline planning model.  However, 
as explained in [9], the friction factor was scaled down 
by an engineering factor of 0.85 to compensate for pipe 
efficiency factors commonly used by commercial 
software packages but not considered in the reduced 
modeling approach.   
The temporal network model consists of 
measurements from the SCADA system used for 
operation of the pipeline from which the test system 
model was extracted.  This system provides hourly 
measurements of pressure (psig), temperature (degrees 
F), and volumetric flow (mcfh) out of the system at 31 
metered custody transfer meter and check 
measurement locations, as well as average gas gravity 
and thermal content (mBTU/mmscfd).  Check 
measurements at the 4 compressor stations include 
suction and discharge pressure (psig), suction and 
discharge temperature (degrees F), and volumetric 
through-flow (mcfh).  Using this information, we 
computed mass flow (mmscfd) at each reduced 
network model location where flow leaves or enters the 
system and pressure at the slack node.   
The temporal quantities of interest for our analysis 
in this paper are SCADA-based hourly incoming and 
outgoing flows that, combined with publicly available 
pricing information, we use to construct time 
dependent bid and offer price/quantity pairs. 
 
3.2 Economic Data and Assumptions 
 
    As explained in Sec. 2.2 and 2.3, hourly buy/sell 
positions of buyer and sellers of natural gas within the 
modeled footprint are required as inputs into the GBM.  
At present, no statistical data of that kind exists.  To 
compensate for this, we made several assumptions. 
   First, we assumed that the only controllable supply is 
located at the entry point of inflow into compressor 1, 
which effectively represents all suppliers located 
upstream of the footprint.  To test the physical and 
economic limitations of the modeled footprint, we 
assumed that controllable supply is unlimited in 
magnitude, up to engineering constraints at the inflow 
location.    
   Second, we considered four controllable demand 
locations – exit point X and three power plants at 
points E, H and Q.  For power plants, we assumed that 
their demand for natural gas is capped at the level of 
actual hourly deliveries.  As explained in the next 
section, depending on the experiment, the exit point 
was modeled both as capped at actual gas deliveries or 
as an unlimited gas buyer. 
  Depending on the experiment, we considered two sets 
of pricing assumptions. To assess physical 
deliverability of the system we assumed offer and bid 
prices for controllable supply and demand that were 
constant in time.  Bid prices for all locations were set 
above the offer price and equal for all locations.  Under 
this assumption, the GSO algorithm would maximize 
total deliveries to controllable demand and make no 
economic preference for individual delivery points. 
    For pricing and social welfare analyses described in 
the next section, we assumed that upstream supply was 
available at the corresponding regional pricing index 
obtained from the S&P Global Market Intelligence 
service (S&P Global).   
    For power plants, bids were based on ratios of 
Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs) at power plants’ 
pricing nodes divided by their respective full load heat 
rates obtained from S&P Global.  These bids change 
hourly and effectively represent an estimate of power 
plants’ willingness to pay for fuel given hourly prices 
they receive for selling electricity. 
   For the downstream exit point, we used two pricing 
points – the regional downstream price index applied 
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to deliveries capped at the actual hourly level and an 
hourly price for incremental deliveries above actual 
levels.  For incremental demand at the exit point under 
the price was set similarly to power plants’ and based 
on hourly LMPs at an electric trading hub in the area 
served by the downstream portion of the pipeline.  That 
LMP is divided by a factor of 8.5 Mcf/MWh which is a 
mid-point between a typical combined cycle power 
plant and a combustion turbine generating unit.  The 
resulting bid approximates the hourly willingness to 
pay by a representative gas-fired generating unit served 
by a downstream pipeline segment. 
Upstream and downstream natural gas pricing indices 
were based on relevant pipeline trading hubs with 
values obtained from S&P Global. These prices change 
daily on weekdays only, prices for Friday apply also on 
Saturday and Sunday. 
          
3.3. Objectives and Design of Numerical 
Experiments  
 
   The objectives of numerical experiments conducted 
with the use GSO applied to the above described 
dataset were to evaluate the potential effect of transient 
optimization on physical natural gas deliverability, on 
economic efficiency and to evaluate the relationship 
between LTVs and regional day-ahead prices.  To meet 
these objectives, we conducted four experiments 1) 
Physical Base Case (PBC); 2) Throughput 
maximization (TM); 3) Economic Base Case (EBC) 
and 4) Social Welfare maximization (SWM). All 4 
cases share the same network model parameters and 
hourly incoming and outgoing flow data.  These cases 
differ in terms of which flows are controllable by GSO 
and the offer/bid values assigned to controllable flows. 
An unlimited Controllable Supply was placed at the 
upstream entry point in all four cases. Offer prices at 
the upstream entry point were set as shown in the table 
below: 
 
PBC TM EBC SWM 
$2/Mcf $2/Mcf Upstream 
zone index 
Upstream 
zone index 
 
   Demand bids were placed at the downstream exit 
point and at three locations serving power plants. The 
maximum controllable demand for power plants was 
set in each hour matching their actual hourly gas use.  
Under the PBC and EBC cases, controllable demand 
for the exit point was set at actual hourly out-flows.  
Under the TM and SWM cases, controllable demand at 
the exit point was doubled in size. 
    Bid prices for controllable demand were defined as 
specified in the table below 
 
PBC TM EBC SWM 
Power Plants 
$3/Mcf $3/Mcf LMP/HR LMP/HR 
Downstream Exit Point  
$3/Mcf $3/Mcf Downstream 
zone index 
LMP/8.5 
    
   In all four cases, GSO was set to maximize social 
welfare.  In the PBC and TM cases, buyers were 
willing to pay $3/Mcf and a single seller was offering 
unlimited supply at $2/Mcf.  Selecting such parameters 
guarantees that the system would maximize the 
throughput effectively measured at a $1/Mcf spread 
between buyers’ bid seller’s offer.  In the EBC and 
SWM cases, and social welfare maximization was 
made sensitive to market prices reflective of relative 
values placed on natural gas supply and electricity 
demand during the two-month period of February and 
March of 2014. 
   The purpose of the PBC Case was to set up a 
comparison point against which to measure the effect 
of the transient optimization under the TM case.  At the 
same time, we use the output of the PBC case to assess 
the reasonableness of the optimization model against 
SCADA data.  Indeed, unlike the benchmarking 
performed in [9] where simulations relied on actual 
compressor setting, in the PBC case compressor 
operations are established by GSO and are unlikely to 
match actual compressor settings used.  However, it is 
important to compare optimization results to actual 
data to verify that optimized results are reasonable.  
The results of such comparisons are illustrated in 
Figure 3 for February 2014. The figure depicts hourly 
discharge compressor pressure values computed by 
GSO compared with SCADA measurements, and 
confirms that simulated values are within the range of 
observed values.  Comparisons made for March of 
2014, not presented here, also support that conclusion.  
  The purpose of the TM experiment was to find the 
maximum realizable throughput in the same pipeline 
segment over and above actually realized demand. 
   The objective of the EBC experiment was to compute 
Locational Trade Values (LTVs) associated with the 
Base Case flow regime by using the observed pricing 
data.  Once the LTVs were obtained, it became 
possible to estimate an associated social welfare.   
   The objective of the SWM case was to maximize the 
throughput at the time of need.  The need is reflected in 
the value of incremental demand based on the 
approximated willingness of downstream electric 
generators to pay for gas supplies.  That was in contrast 
to the TM case in which the throughput was 
maximized assuming that it was always needed.  In 
addition, under the SWM case we directly assessed the 
social welfare of the gas supply system under study, 
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compared it to the social welfare estimated under the 
EBC case and thus obtained the economic effect of the 
GBM mechanism based on transient optimization 
techniques.  
   In our rolling horizon modeling, we optimized the 
system for a 48-hour horizon with a 24-hour 
periodicity. System conditions were equalized at the 
beginning of the first and at the end of the last 
optimization hour and the state of the system was 
unloaded at the end of the 24th hour of the optimization 
horizon.  That system state was used as an initial 
condition for modeling the subsequent 48-hour 
horizon.  The 24-hour periodicity reflects the daily 
decision cycle.  Selection of the 48-hour optimization 
horizon is a reasonable assumption reflecting the 
difficulty for power plants to estimate their willingness 
to pay for gas over a longer horizon.  
 
4. Analysis and Economic Implications 
A comparison of simulation results under the four 
cases described in the previous section are summarized 
in Table 1.   
 
Table 1.  Estimated Effects of GBM using Transient 
Pipeline Optimization 
 February 2014 March 2014 
Throughput increase 
TM – PBC 12% 14% 
SWM – EBC 7% 9% 
Price reduction at exit 
point (EBC) 
28% 14% 
Increase in Social 
Welfare (SWM – EBC) 
8% 7% 
 
As presented in that Table, using transient optimization 
methods have the potential to increase pipeline 
throughput by 12% - 14% at the time of significantly 
constrained operations such as those under the Polar 
Vortex conditions during the winter of 2014.  The daily 
and hourly throughput comparison between the PBC 
and TM cases for February 2014 are shown in Fig. 4 
and Fig. 5, respectively.  Results for March 2014, 
although not shown, look similar and confirm the 
above conclusion.  
Hourly and daily delivery dynamics shown in these 
two figures indicate that the maximum achievable 
throughput changes over time.  Although maximized 
deliveries are reflective of system capacity, the latter 
appears to be dependent on system conditions. 
 
Figure 4. Daily Effect to Throughput Optimization 
(Feb-2014) 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Hourly Effect of Throughput 
Optimization (Feb-2014) 
    
As one would expect, optimized incremental deliveries 
appear to be bigger in magnitude at the time of lower 
deliveries under the PCB case.  This observation 
indicates that incremental throughput may appear at 
times when it is not needed and the 12% - 14% 
increase in throughput may be overstating the 
economic effect of transient optimization. 
  The EBC and SWM cases designed to address these 
concerns indicate that the magnitude of the incremental 
throughput at the time of need is in the range of 
between 7% and 9%.  The need here is measured in 
terms of the estimated willingness of power generators 
located downstream to pay for gas relative to the gas 
supplier offer price.   
   The 7% - 9% effect is smaller than under the TM – 
PBC comparison, but is still very significant 
considering that it is measured under extremely 
constrained historical operational conditions.  
   We estimate a 7% - 8% increase in social welfare of 
the operation of the pipeline segment under study 
attributable to the modeled implementation of GBM.     
By analyzing LTV values under the EBC scenario 
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shown daily in Fig. 6 and hourly in Fig. 7.  This 
comparison indicates that using GBM-based LTVs as a 
pricing mechanism for natural gas could have 
significantly reduced natural gas prices to consumers 
and at the same time electricity production costs and 
resulting electricity prices.  The noted difference 
between the zonal price index and LTVs indicates that 
most of the time, LTV serves as price cap – that is 
particularly visible in Figure 7.  On any day, under the 
EBC scenario flows are constrained only in a few 
hours at most. As a result, only in these hours LTVs hit 
the price cap.   The magnitude of price reduction in 
March appears much smaller than in February. This is 
simply because that March prices were less volatile 
than in February resulting in lower average price 
differences. 
    
     
 
Figure 6. LTV vs. Downstream Price Index - Daily 
Comparison 
 
 
Figure 7. LTV vs. Downstream Price Index, Hourly 
Comparison 
 
      The above analyses are performed under 
intentionally narrow but realistic assumptions, 
constrained by the economic data available.  As a 
result, we considered a very narrow application of the 
GBM limited to a very few locations on the pipeline 
system – an entry point, an exit point and three power 
plant locations.  No flexibility and trading 
opportunities were assumed for supply and deliveries 
for all other points due to the lack of underlying 
economic data.  Our conjecture is that the effect of the 
GBM based on transient pipeline optimization may be 
significantly bigger if the scope of market participants 
was more broadly spanned over the pipeline network 
resulting in greater elasticity of supply and demand in 
the system. 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
The focus of this paper was to review the Gas 
Balancing Market (GBM)  design and present a case 
study based on historical data of a pipeline subsystem 
in the United States. The proposed GBM is structured 
to complement the timing and logic of the existing US 
natural gas markets.  It is specifically designed to 
operate in the time period when there is no other 
formal market mechanism.  The goal of the GBM is to 
improve the economic and operating efficiencies of 
both the natural gas and the electric markets.  The fact 
that the GBM follows the standard gas day market and 
is a voluntary, platform-based bilateral market means 
that the GBM requires no changes in today’s 
operational markets and may not require more than 
standard market oversight, i.e., is not likely to require 
FERC approval for its establishment.  
The economic implications of the establishment of a 
GBM are significant as discussed in Section 4.  In the 
case study presented for a real pipeline subsystem we 
show that at a time of constrained delivery capability 
because of extreme weather conditions, the GBM 
structure would have allowed for an increase in natural 
gas throughput of 12% to 14%.  The impact on the 
electric market during this time period would have 
been a decrease in cost natural gas costs as a fuel for 
electric generation of 14% to 28%, with an effect on 
electricity prices of the same order of magnitude.  
The GBM is proposed to operate on a pipeline by 
pipeline basis or potentially begin with operation on a 
constrained segment or end of a pipeline.  As a result, 
the GBM would explicitly not require any type of 
regional organization to coordinate its operations.  A 
GBM could be instituted at a single pipeline level and 
could also be set to serve only a part of the pipeline 
system, to simplify an initial implementation.   
   Participation in the GBM would be entirely 
voluntary.  The bilateral, auction-based structure 
provides the opportunity of participation and additional 
revenue through the clearing mechanism but is not 
obligatory relative either to the physical operation of 
the pipeline or of the economic benefits that can 
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accrue.  Participants will enter and leave, buy and sell 
if and when the benefits of participation exceed the 
costs of participation.     
     Participation in the GBM offers benefits to 
market participats both on the gas side and on the 
electric side.  On the gas side, the GBM will provide 
relief of pipeline constraints through LTV-sensitive 
optimization of compressors helping to determine the 
most efficient line pack strategy over time and across 
the system to assure higher delivery to locations with 
the highest value of gas.  At the same time, redispatch 
of electric generation in response to dynamically 
formed LTVs will provide additional relief of pipeline 
constraints.   
In the long run we have shown that the creation of 
the GBM will help the pipeline and their customers 
make better operating and investment decisions.   
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Figure 3.  Compressor Settings Simulated vs. Actual, February 2014 
Figure 2.  Pipeline Network Diagram 
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